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Abstract 
In his celebrated 2009 memoir Returning to Reims, the Parisian intellectual and 
theorist Didier Eribon travels home for the first time in thirty years following 
the death of his father. There he tries to account for the change in politics of his 
working class family over the period he has been away: from supporting the 
Communist Party to voting for the National Front. But Eribon also discusses 
the transition he himself has undergone as a result of having escaped his working 
class culture and environment through education, and how this has left him 
unsure whom it is he is actually writing for. He may be addressing the question 
of what it means to grow up poor and gay, however he is aware few working 
class people are ever likely to read his book. 
 
At the same time, Eribon emphasizes that his non-conforming identity has left 
him with a sense of just how important it is to display a ‘lack of respect for the 
rules’ of bourgeois liberal humanist ‘decorum that reign in university circles’, and 
that insist ‘people follow established norms regarding “intellectual debate” when 
what is at stake clearly has to do with political struggle’. Together with his friend 
Édouard Louis and partner Geoffroy de Lagasnerie, Eribon wants to ‘rethink’ 
the antihumanist theoretical tradition of Foucault, Derrida, Cixous et al. to 
produce a theory ‘in which something is at stake’: a theory that speaks about 
‘class, exploitation, violence, repression, domination, intersectionality’, and yet 
has the potential to generate the same kind of power and excitement as ‘a 
Kendrick Lamar concert’.  
 
With ‘Anti-Bourgeois Theory’, I likewise want to reinvent what it means to 
theorise by showing a certain lack of respect for the rules of bourgeois decorum 
the university hardly ever questions. I want do so, however, by also breaking 
with those bourgeois liberal humanist conventions of intellectual debate that – 
for all his emphasis on rebelling ‘in and through’ the technologies of knowledge 
production – continue to govern the antihumanist theoretical tradition Eribon 
and his collaborators are associated with. Included in these conventions are 
culturally normative ideas of the human subject, the proprietorial author, the 
codex print book, critical reflection, linear thought, the long-form argument, 
self-expression, originality, creativity, fixity and copyright. I will argue that even 
the current landfill of theoretical literature on the posthuman and the 
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Anthropocene is merely a form of bourgeois liberal humanism that is padded 
with nonhuman stuffing – technologies, objects, animals, insects, plants, fungi, 
compost, microbes, stones, geological formations – to make it appear different. 
Can we not do better than this? 
 
Keywords 
Class, culture, environment, climate crisis, Anthropocene, liberalism, humanism, 
posthuman, inhuman 
 
 
 
“I have no social class, marginalized as I am. The upper class considers me a weird 
monster, the middle class worries I might unsettle them, the lower class never comes 
to me.”  
Clarice Lispector, The Hour of the Star 
 
I. Class in Elitist Britain 
During the summer of 2018, I attended an event to mark the publication in English of 
Returning to Reims by Didier Eribon (2018) and History of Violence by Édouard Louis 
(2018). In Eribon’s powerful memoir, the Parisian sociologist travels home for the first 
time in thirty years following the death of his father (Eribon, 2013: 33).1 There he tries 
to account for the shift in politics of his working class family while he has been away: 
from supporting the Communist Party to voting for the National Front. Returning to 
Reims was a significant influence on Louis, inspiring him to write his bestselling first 
novel, The End of Eddy, which he dedicated to Eribon (Louis, 2017). Like the latter’s 
memoir, History of Violence and The End of Eddy both in their different ways tell the story 
of how the author, having grown up gay and poor in post-industrial northern France, 
was eventually able to escape his working class environment through study and 
education.  
As is customary on these occasions, the authors read from their books and discussed 
their work and lives, followed by a Q&A session with the audience. During this latter 
part of the evening they spoke about the transition they had made from the social 
realm of the working class to that of the middle class, with its very different gestures, 
knowledges and manners of speech. Recognising they now had a foot in both camps, 
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each said the process of reinventing themselves had nonetheless left them feeling they 
truly belonged to neither. Arriving in Paris at the age of twenty, for instance, Eribon 
found it much easier to come out of the sexual closet and assert his homosexuality to 
his new cosmopolitan friends than to come out of the class closet.  
Both authors also described how, as a consequence, they were unsure for whom they 
were actually writing. They may be addressing the question of what it means to grow 
up in a working class environment in Returning to Reims and History of Violence: the 
profound racism, sexism and homophobia they found there; the violent modes of 
domination and subjectivation; the social impoverishment; the lack of possibilities that 
are imaginable, to say nothing of those that are actually realisable. However, they were 
aware few people from that social class were ever likely to read their books, so can 
hardly say they were writing for them.  
What really captured my attention, though, was the moment Eribon and Louis stressed 
that what they were trying to do with their writing was ‘reinvent theory’: to produce a 
theory in which ‘something is at stake’. (Together with Eribon’s partner Geoffroy de 
Lagasnerie, they have described this elsewhere as a theory that speaks about ‘class, 
exploitation, violence, repression, domination, intersectionality’ and yet has the 
potential to generate the excitement of ‘a Kendrick Lamar concert’) [de Lagasnerie and 
Louis, 2015; de Lagasnerie, 2018]. Eribon is of course the author of a well-known 
biography of the philosopher Michel Foucault. Nevertheless this statement struck me: 
partly because theory is one of the areas I work in; but mainly because it’s difficult to 
imagine many English literary writers of similar stature engaging with the kind of 
radical thought Foucault and his contemporaries are associated with, let alone 
expressing a desire to reinvent it. Since it undermines the idea of the self-identical 
human subject, that theoretical tradition is often described as antihumanist – or as 
posthumanist in some of its more recent manifestations. By contrast, English literary 
culture (and I’m saying English rather than British literary culture quite deliberately here) 
is predominantly humanist and liberal, seeing education in general, and the reading and 
writing of literature in particular, as a means of freeing the mind of a rational human 
individual whose identity is more or less fixed and unchanging. 
One explanation given for this difference is that, historically, writers in England have 
been more closely associated with the ruling elite: with public schools, Oxbridge 
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colleges and the tradition of the gentleman as amateur scholar. It’s an association that 
contrasts sharply with the cafes, streets and factory shop floors of the more political 
French intellectual. Suspicious as much of English culture is of radical and abstract ideas, 
epitomized by the emphasis in France on the universal values of freedom, justice and 
liberty since at least the revolution of 1879, ‘the intellectual’ is often viewed negatively: 
as someone who is conceited, egotistical and superior. To be treated positively as an 
intellectual in England it’s best not to be extremely intellectual. So authors such as Mary 
Beard and Timothy Garton Ash are considered acceptable and taken seriously, as they 
can write clearly in ‘plain English’ and communicate with a wider public, even attain 
the holy grail of a popular readership. Theorists such as Catherine Malabou and Bruno 
Latour are not, as, ironically enough, England’s elitist culture regards their philosophy 
and use of language as being too complex for most ‘real’ people to understand.  
This constant policing of the parameters of acceptability explains why the literary novel 
in England today is so unashamedly humanist. Scottish journalist Stuart Kelly even 
goes so far as to compare it unfavourably to the ‘posthuman novel’ that is the TV 
series Westworld. (I’m drawing on newspaper commentary here to show mainstream 
culture in the U.K. is not entirely dominated by uncritical liberal humanist thought.) For 
Kelly, the modern literary novel and its understanding of life is ‘outdated’, still 
constrained by its 18th century origins. Nowhere is this more evident than with its 
‘unquestioned foundations’, based as they are on the idea of the autonomous human 
subject as protagonist, someone who has an ‘intact self’, ‘cogent agency’, ‘memories 
they trust – and can trust – and desires they understand’ (Kelly, 2016).   
In Whatever Happened To Modernism?, Gabriel Josipovici characterises the novel of the 
Julian Barnes/Martin Amis generation as the product of a non-modernistic literary 
culture that is determinedly realist, preferring sentimental humanism and readability to 
the kind of ground-breaking experimentation he associates with previous eras of the 
European novel (Josipovici, 2001). That may be, but the cure for English culture’s 
addiction to the world-view of prosperous, middle-class white men – or fear of 
revolution, the underclass and the other, depending on how you look at it – is not 
simply more modernism. As Isabel Waidner emphasizes in their anthology of innovative 
writing (Waidner’s preferred pronouns are they/them/their), even experimental 
literature in England is predominantly white, bourgeois and patriarchal, very much to 
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the exclusion of (non-Oxbridge) BAME, LGBTQIAP+, working class and other 
nonconforming identities (Waidner, 2018). Nor is this particularly surprising. After all, 
7% of the UK population attend private school (that’s over 600,000 pupils, double the 
number of the 1970s), and approximately 1% graduate from Oxford or Cambridge. 
Yet it was reported in 2018 that ‘of the poets and novelists included in Who’s Who … 
half went to private schools; and 44% went to Oxbridge.’2 One result of this systematic 
bias is that non-white British authors published fewer than 100 titles in 2016 (Shaffi, 
2016).  
I began by referring to social realms that contain a lack of possibilities that are even 
imaginable, let alone achievable. It’s worth noting in this context that, of the 9,115 
children’s books published in the U.K. in 2017, only 4% featured BAME characters. 
Just 1% had a BAME lead character, 96% having no BAME characters whatsoever 
(Centre for Literacy in Primary Education, 2018). Nor is it only literary culture that’s 
affected by what Eribon describes as the ‘terrible injustice’ of the ‘unequal distribution 
of prospects and possibilities’ (52). Comparable statistics can be provided for the arts, 
drama, music, business, politics, the law, medicine, the military, the civil service, the 
media and journalism. 54% of the U.K.’s ‘top’ news journalists were educated in 
private schools, for example; while of the 81% who attended university, more than a 
half were educated at Oxbridge, with a third attending just one institution, Oxford 
(Sutton Trust, 2006).3 Moreover, 94% of all journalists in the U.K. are white and as 
few as 0.2% black (Thurman, 2016).  
In a modest bid to counter such inequality of opportunity and stalling of social 
mobility, the BBC Radio 6 presenter Cerys Matthews has said she wants to program 
less music on her show by artists who’ve been given a leg up by virtue of attending 
private school, and more music by people from all walks of life, including women and 
those with a working-class upbringing (Paine, 2018). Which makes me wonder: if we 
do want to foster culture in England that’s not so liberal and humanist, if we do want 
to develop an understanding of life, agency and subjectivity that is more complex – or 
at least not quite so outdated and elitist – should we adopt a similar stance? Instead of 
setting up prizes like the Goldsmiths in order to reward literature that is daring and 
inventive, should we publish (and perhaps read and cite) fewer texts by people who went 
to private school or Oxbridge, and more by writers from other backgrounds? In 
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keeping with the ‘Abolish Eton’ motion passed at September’s Labour party 
conference, which demands the introduction of legislation to ensure limits are placed 
on the number of private school pupils entering Oxbridge, should we even have 
quotas? 4  
 
II. Bourgeois Theory 
If one result of English culture’s systematic bias is an inequality of opportunity, another 
is its long history of anti-intellectualism. As Alex Renton remarks in Stiff Upper Lip, by 
the close of the nineteenth century most public schools were ‘determinedly anti-
intellectual, for reasons chiefly of snobbery – gentlemen should not be taught the skills 
of tradesmen’ (Renton, 2017: 131). Renton goes on to note how these institutions 
largely taught classics. In 1861 the Clarendon Commission quizzed Oxford 
undergraduates who had gone to the nine great schools (Eton, Charterhouse, Harrow, 
Rugby, Shrewsbury, Westminster, Winchester, St Paul’s and Merchant Taylors), and 
discovered they ‘knew very little of geography, history or science, and had “great 
deficiencies” even in reading and spelling in English’ (132). It’s a state of affairs far 
from confined to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. ‘Education at the 
public schools – and many of the grammar schools that aped them – remained 
primarily a matter of learning Latin and Greek until the 1950s’, Renton observes. ‘It 
was still important in getting scholarships until the 1980s’ (27). (Hence the enthusiasm 
of Eton College King’s Scholar Boris Johnson for quoting Roman and Greek 
historians – although doing so also acts as a marker of his membership of the ruling 
elite, of course.) Renton makes a direct connection between the anti-intellectualism of 
these establishments and that of English public life more generally. So, too, does the 
author and publisher Leonard Woolf. In his autobiography, published in 1960, Woolf 
sums up the situation as follows:  
England for considerably more than one hundred years has been the most 
philistine of all European countries. This, I suspect, is largely due to the 
public schools, which during the period gradually established a dominating 
influence on public life and imposed upon the whole nation their 
prejudices, habits, morals, and standards of value. The public school was 
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the nursery of British philistinism. To work, to use the mind, to be a ‘swot’, 
as it was called in my school days, was to become an untouchable (except 
for the purposes of bullying) in the hierarchy of the public-school caste 
system… Use of the mind, intellectual curiosity, mental originality, interest 
in ‘work’, enjoyment of books or anything connected with the arts, all such 
things, if detected, were violently condemned and persecuted … this 
attitude was not confined to the boys; it was shared and encouraged by 
nearly all the masters. The intellectual was, and he [sic] still is today, 
disliked and despised (Woolf, 1960: 96-97).  
Instead of developing the intellect, the emphasis was very much on the body and 
sports. Football, cricket and rugby were all used ‘to define physical and psychological 
character’, as well as to exhaust and otherwise ‘distract boys from exploring 
homosexual relationships’, writes Robert Verkaik in Posh Boys. It’s an ethos the legacy 
of which survives to this day. In ‘2012 and 2016 half the British Olympic teams came 
from private schools’, he notes (Verkaik, 2018: 36). 
I realise making such arguments can come across as strident, blunt or even rude. 
However, I am guided here by another refreshing aspect of the approach of Eribon 
and Louis to reinventing theory: their willingness to be disrespectful. Eribon 
encapsulates it best in Returning to Reims. Praising the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre for 
having insulted the liberal sociologist Raymond Aron in 1968 for being a ‘defender of 
the bourgeois establishment’, Eribon stresses the importance of ‘daring to break with 
the conventions of polite academic “discussion” – which always works in favour of 
“orthodoxy”, and its reliance on “common sense” and what seems “self-evident” in 
its opposition to heterodoxy and critical thought’ (101). 
In drawing attention to the fact that so many writers in the U.K. attended private 
schools and Oxbridge, I’m therefore not just making a crude and somewhat ill-
mannered point about class inequality, a point that’s already quite familiar by now in 
any case. I’m also trying to explain why so much of the culture in England remains 
doggedly liberal humanist, middle class and anti-intellectual. At the same time, I believe 
theory can help us to understand this situation and to think it through. For example, 
is the idea we should avoid difficult ‘jargon’ in order to communicate better with so-
called ordinary people really so self-evident? Is it not rather an instance of what, 
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following Antonio Gramsci, we can call society’s manufactured ‘common sense’, the 
ideology used to maintain the status quo – and more and more today to eliminate 
reasonable dissent? Is this one of the reasons we’re experiencing an ongoing backlash 
against theory, not just in journalism and the media but in academia too? The reason 
theory is important and shouldn’t be dismissed, no matter how abstract its ideas and 
how challenging its rhetorical style (and no matter how badly some ‘star’ theorists have 
behaved on a professional or personal level), is because it enables us to understand our 
modes of being and doing in the world, and conceive of them differently and so change 
them.  
That said, it’s not my intention to suggest we should all simply read more French 
theory: that we’d all now be posthumanists in England if only Napoleon had won at 
Waterloo. Like Eribon and Louis, I want to promote heterodoxy and critical thought; and 
I want to do so to the extent of daring to break even with the conventions of theory 
and what it’s currently considered to be. For this tradition of critical thought has its 
own blindspots that lead it to accept certain assumptions as common sense as well.  
Many of these blindspots relate to how neoliberalism and its technical systems (e.g. 
social media such as Twitter and YouTube, professional social networks such as 
Academia.edu, online research portals and disciplinary repositories such as Elsevier’s 
PURE and SSRN) have found ways to incorporate those theorists McKenzie Wark calls 
‘general intellects’ in her book of the same name, and who are today typically employed 
as academics as opposed to the public intellectuals of the past such as Sartre and 
Simone de Beauvoir (Wark, 2017a). My point is not that contemporary intellectual 
labourers are merely constituent elements of the general intellect or ‘social brain’, 
whose only purpose ‘is to keep commodification going and profits flowing’. I don’t 
deny such commercially-oriented theorists are, as Wark says, also trying to ‘find ways to 
write and think and even act in and against this very system of commodification that 
has now found ways to incorporate even them’. My argument is that their efforts to 
do so contain a number of blindspots – or, perhaps better, datum points – which limit 
their ‘ability to grasp the general situation’.5 This is especially the case as far as the 
bourgeois liberal humanist categories and frameworks with which they continue to 
operate are concerned. For them, too, datum points such as the unique human author, 
originality, creativity, immutability and copyright are in practice held as self-evidently 
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providing the basis for well-mannered debate. Far from theory enabling individuals 
and groups to think differently about what they are and what they do, the taking-for-
granted of such categories and frameworks leads many intellectual labourers today to 
likewise work in favour of orthodoxy and the perpetuation of the established order.  I want 
to stress that I am adopting Wark’s own methodology here: that of reading such texts 
‘against themselves, bringing some of the same critical tactics to bear’ on the writings 
of these general intellects, including Wark herself, in order ‘to find their limitations.’ 
After all, does Wark not acknowledge that the general intellects she focuses on in her 
book ‘remain rather bourgeois thinkers’ in some respects? 
This is why I’m interested in experimenting with ways of being a theorist I’m aware a 
lot of people might find counter-intuitive and difficult to grasp – and perhaps even to 
take seriously. Through my involvement with projects such as Pirate Philosophy (see 
Hall, 2009) and the Radical Open Access Collective, I’m exploring what forms our 
work can take if, in its performance, it doesn’t simply go along with the pressure the 
neoliberal university places on us to deliver more ever quicker, and the accompanying 
spread of managerial technologies of measurement and commodification such as 
rankings, citation indexes and other metrics.6 But I’m also exploring what forms our 
work can take if it likewise avoids falling into the trap of trying to counter the politics 
of the accelerated academy and its technological systems by resorting to a form of 
liberal humanism by default – evident in demands to ‘“slow down”’ or go back even, 
or the ‘assertion of the intrinsic value/unquantifiable character of scholarship’.7  
This last part is undoubtedly tricky. There’s no easy way for us to avoid adhering to 
liberal humanist ways of being and doing as authors and academics – no matter how 
posthuman the content of our theory may be. The reason is because of the strong link 
that exists between our copyright laws and the production of liberal humanist 
subjectivity and agency. (As Mark Rose [1993: 142]) shows: ‘Copyright is not a 
transcendent moral idea, but a specifically modern formation [of property rights] 
produced by printing technology, marketplace economics and the classical liberal 
culture of possessive individualism’.) This link in turn means there are no non-liberal 
and non-humanist alternatives to publishing and sharing our work on a copyright all 
rights reserved basis that are legally and professionally recognised. And this is the case 
even with regard to those instances in which a writer identifies as having a fluid, non-
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binary identity that is neither male nor female, and adopts personal pronouns such as 
they/them/their. 
In large part this lack of alternatives is due to the fact that, although the U.K., U.S. and 
Europe have different requirements for copyrightability, in all of them copyright is 
dependent on the figure of the singular human author. From this standpoint, our 
current copyright laws have a threefold function: 1) They protect the author’s 
economic and moral rights, as is generally understood. Yet – and this is something that 
is less frequently appreciated – they also participate in: 2) creating and shaping the 
author as a sovereign, liberal, human subject; and 3) making it difficult for the author to 
adopt other forms – forms that are capable of acknowledging and assuming (rather than 
ignoring or repressing) the implications of texts coming into being through the various 
multiple and messy intra-actions of an extended assemblage of both humans and 
nonhumans.  
Do the restrictions imposed on us by our laws of intellectual property explain why 
most radical philosophers today work in a surprisingly conservative (i.e. liberal) 
fashion? Even political theorists who are known for engaging directly with new forms 
of subjectivity and social relations, such as those associated with the horizontalist, self-
organizing, leaderless mobilizations of the Occupy, Black Lives Matter, Dakota 
Standing Rock Sioux, gilets jaunes and Extinction Rebellion protests are no exception. 
I’m thinking here of Alain Badiou, Judith Butler, Jodi Dean, David Graeber, Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri, Chantal Mouffe, Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams, Slavoj 
Žižek... the list is a long one. By working in a conservative fashion I mean texts such 
as Assembly, Podemos and Crowds and Party are all written as if they were the absolutely 
authentic creative expressions of the minds of unique sovereign individuals who are 
quite entitled to claim the moral and legal right to be identified as their singular human 
authors (Hardt and Negri, 2017; Errejón and Mouffe, 2016; Dean, 2016). They are 
then made available on this basis for economic exploitation by a publisher as 
commodities, in the form of books that can be bought and sold according to a system 
of property exchange that is governed by the logic of capital and its competitive, 
individualistic ethos.  
The situation is not helped by the fact that, when radical thinkers do turn their attention 
to how scholars operate nowadays, their concern is predominantly with the neoliberal 
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subjects we are supposedly transitioning into with the help of digital information 
technologies. They are not quite so concerned about the particular configurations of 
subjectivity and the related information technologies (i.e., commercially copyrighted, 
printed-paper codex books and journal articles) we are changing from. The point I’m 
making here is that it’s of fundamental importance to pay close critical attention to the 
latter, too. This is because in practice it has typically been a liberal, humanist subjectivity. 
When it comes to the actual creation, publication and communication of research especially, this 
model of subjectivity has occupied a position of hegemonic dominance within the 
profession – and, in many respects, still does. The reason is simple: liberal humanism 
is built into the very system of the university.8  As Christopher Newfield explains with 
regard to higher education in the U.S., ‘a consensus version of university humanism 
has long consisted of “five interwoven concepts: the free self, experiential knowledge, 
self-development, autonomous agency, and enjoyment.”’ What’s more, ‘university 
philosophers and administrators did not simply espouse these concepts as ideals but 
institutionalised them’ (Newfield, 2016: 329; quoting Newfield, 2003: 56).9  
If liberalism, in a nutshell, is concerned with the human individual’s right to life, liberty 
and property, together with the political conditions and institutions that secure these 
rights (e.g., constitutional government and the rule of law), what’s really being 
condemned in many accounts of the corporatisation of the academy is the manner in 
which a version of liberalism is being intensified and transformed into another, 
specifically neoliberal interpretation of what, among those rights, are deemed most 
important: the unassailable rights of property and extension of the values of the free 
market and its metrics to all areas of life.10 Yet, as I say, the focus of critical attention 
has too often been on the process of change, and especially on what we are changing to 
(capitalist entrepreneurs, including entrepreneurs of our own selves and lives), and not 
on what we are changing from. What is a predominantly liberal, humanist mode of 
academic personhood is, in effect, held up as some kind of solution, or at least 
preferable alternative, to the shift toward the constantly self-disciplining, self-
governing, self-exploitative subject of neoliberalism by default. (It’s an attitude on the 
part of internet scholars that’s encapsulated perfectly, albeit unwittingly, by a remark 
of Shoshana Zuboff’s [in Naughton and Zuboff, 2019: 21] on surveillance capitalism: 
‘Once I was mine. Now I am theirs’.)  
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In other words, a form of liberal humanism, along with the attendant concepts of the 
self-identical autonomous subject, the individual proprietorial author, linear thought, 
the long-form argument, the single-voiced narrative, the fixed and finished object, 
originality, creativity and copyright, acts as something of a datum point in a lot of 
established theory. The writing of peer-reviewed, sequentially-ordered, bound and 
printed-paper codex books and journal articles is a professional practice that is 
perceived as transcending the age in which it is employed, which means continuity in 
these matters tends to be valued more highly than transformation, let alone revolution. 
It’s a manner of operating that is taken for granted as fixed and enduring (although in 
actual fact the activities and concepts it involves are constantly changing and being 
renegotiated over time), and that constitutes a pre-programmed mode of performance 
that many academics adopt more or less passively in order to construct theoretical 
frameworks and draw conclusions. Hence the lack of care shown by even the most 
politically radical of thinkers for the materiality of their own ways of working and 
thinking.  
It can even be argued that the failure to denaturalize and destabilize what, for the sake 
of economy, I have referred to as the liberal humanist model of subjectivity – to confront 
and rigorously think through liberal concepts of human rights, freedom and property as 
they apply to us as theorists (although we understand philosophically that critical theory’s 
questioning of liberal thought must involve questioning these concepts too) – is one 
of the reasons it’s been relatively easy for the commodifying, measuring, monitoring 
logic of neoliberalism to reinterpret our ways of being too. With the wider historical 
tradition of liberalism having provided the discursive framework of modern capitalism, 
neoliberal logic is not necessarily always going against the liberal rights and values that 
many of us continue to adhere to in practice. It is rather, as I say, that under this logic 
aspects of our liberal ways of being and doing have been intensified and transformed 
into another, specifically neoliberal interpretation of what, among those rights and 
values, are deemed to be most significant.  
It’s a set of circumstances that has left many of us in a state of melancholy, of 
unresolved mourning, for what we have lost: unresolved, because the liberal manner 
of performing as academics and theorists is not fully acknowledged as something we 
are attached to, so it’s not something we can work through when we do experience it 
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as a loss. In turn this unresolved mourning can be said to have led to a state of political 
disorientation and paralysis. Since it’s a loss we find difficult to fully acknowledge, we 
are unable to achieve an adequate understanding of how the process of corporatising the 
academy can be productively reinflected, or of what kind of institution we should be 
endeavouring to replace the neoliberal university with.  
Still, the problem is not just that the political rationalities of neoliberalism find it 
relatively easy to shape and control any efforts to counter the becoming business of 
Higher Education by acting as liberals (even radical ones) and calling for a return to 
the rights and values of the public university (i.e., of academic freedom and trust; of 
fundamental as opposed to applied research; of individualised rather than mass 
teaching; and of the relatively autonomous institution, the primary function of which 
is to help build and maintain our democracies through the education of their citizens, 
and so contribute to public value in that fashion rather than through the generation of 
financial profit). It’s also that such calls have a tendency to moralistically discipline and 
reproach, if not indeed close down, attempts to question their own, often ahistorical, 
liberal premises, and to search for different means of being and doing as scholars that 
are neither simply liberal nor neoliberal. We could go so far as to say that, far from part 
of the solution, calls for a restoration of the importance of the liberal values of the 
public university and the traditional humanities, although they may have their hearts 
in the right place, are actually part of the problem.  
 
III. The Obsolescence of Bourgeois Theory in the 
Anthropocene 
Making critical remarks about erstwhile radical political theorists continuing to claim 
the legal right to be identified as the proprietorial authors of their books is often 
dismissed as a vulgar thing to do. Drawing attention to the fact such theorists are 
making their work available for commercial exploitation on this basis, according to a 
system of commodity exchange that is governed by the logic of capital, is considered 
something of a cheap shot. And there may be some truth in this. Still, do such 
dismissals not risk serving as an alibi for the widespread failure to take on board the 
implications of not thinking through liberal concepts of human rights, freedom and 
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property as they apply to us as theorists? Liberalism may mean we are free to make 
rational choices about almost every aspect of life. But it also means we are free to 
choose only within certain limits. What we are certainly not legally and professionally free 
to choose is an authorial identity that operates in a manner consistent with a more 
inhuman form of theory. I’m referring to an identity which functions in terms neither 
of the human nor the nonhuman. Instead, inhuman theory as I see it involves a form 
of communicating that endeavours to take account of and assume (rather than ignore or 
otherwise deny) an intra-active relation with the supposedly nonhuman, be it animal, 
plant life, technology, the planet or the cosmos.  
Why inhuman? And why am I now switching to this term, rather than continuing with 
the posthuman?  
My use of ‘inhuman’ relates to ways the human can’t simply be opposed to the 
nonhuman. There is no such thing as the nonhuman – nor the human for that matter. 
Not in any simple sense. Each is born out of its relation to the other. The nonhuman 
is therefore already in the human – in(the)human – and vice versa. Based as it is on the 
performance of a non-unified, non-essentialist, polymorphous subject (rather than the 
sovereign, self-identical individual of both liberal and neoliberal humanism), it follows 
that inhuman theory can also be understood as an instance of the inhumanities. For if 
the inhuman equals the human intertwined with the nonhuman, then a humanities 
with this intra-active inhuman figure at their heart must become the inhumanities. 
Admittedly, such an understanding of subjectivity and authorship could be gathered 
under the sign of the posthuman. Approaches to the posthuman, however, have been 
dominated by the ‘posthuman humanities’ of Donna Haraway, Rosi Braidotti, Cary 
Wolfe and others.11 Like the radical political philosophers I referred to earlier, these 
theorists of the posthuman continue to work in quite conventional, liberal humanist 
ways. My proposal is that the above transformative conception of the human and the 
humanities can therefore on occasion be more productively articulated in terms of 
the inhuman. The idea is that such a rhetorical and conceptual shift might enable us to 
better challenge the humanist subject that serves as a datum point to so many theories 
– not just of the humanities, but of the posthuman and posthumanities too. Building 
on the argument McKenzie Wark develops in ‘On the Obsolescence of the Bourgeois 
Novel in the Anthropocene’, could we go so far as to characterise the apparent inability 
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of radical theory to operate according to a more inhuman mode of philosophy as a sign 
of its obsolescence?12  
Wark’s text on the bourgeois novel was published on the blog of Verso Books as an 
addition to the collection of critical appreciations she provides in General Intellects: 
Twenty-One Thinkers for the Twenty-First (Wark, 2017a). While the chapters in that book 
offer succinct analyses of individual thinkers such as Isabelle Stengers, Hiroki Azuma 
and Paul B. Préciado, Wark’s focus in ‘On the Obsolescence of the Bourgeois Novel’ 
is The Great Derangement: Climate Change and the Unthinkable by the writer and novelist 
Amitav Ghosh (2016). In this non-fiction book, Ghosh contemplates the 
environmental crisis and global warming from a literary perspective that has its origins 
in the Indian subcontinent. As far as he is concerned, climate change is not just about 
ecological problems, or even capitalism and its carbon-based political economy. 
Climate change is about empire, it’s about imperialism; above all it’s about climate justice. 
Providing an account of Ghosh’s influential lectures on the great derangement thus enables 
Wark to conceive of a geo-humanities project that brings earth science into contact with 
‘post-colonial voices that have pushed back against imperial mappings of the world.’ 
In doing so she acknowledges that approaching climate change in terms of social 
justice brings with it a conceptual challenge. ‘One has to avoid excluding the diversity 
of human voices,’ Wark writes, quoting from The Great Derangement, ‘and yet at the 
same time avoid excluding the non-human world and rendering it a mere background, 
or “environment.” One has to voice “the urgent proximity of nonhuman presences”’ 
(Wark, 2017b; quoting Ghosh, 2016: 5). 
Ghosh approaches this conceptual challenge as a literary problem. The difficulty, 
however, is that climate change (or climate crisis or climate breakdown as many are 
now terming it in attempt to describe the environmental emergency we are now facing 
more accurately) goes far beyond what can be expressed in the form of the bourgeois 
novel. The issue is summed up for Wark by the fact that ‘fiction that takes climate 
change seriously is not taken seriously as fiction’. Hence some of the best responses 
to the Anthropocene have for her been provided by science-fiction. Hence, too, 
Ghosh’s concern that we are now ‘entering into a great derangement’. Wark describes this 
as ‘a time when art and literature concealed rather than articulated the nature of the 
times and the time of nature.’ In place of dealing with the Anthropocene, novels 
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become choked with what, following Franco Moretti, can be thought of as ‘filler, the 
everyday life of bourgeois society, its objects, decors, styles and habits’ (Wark, 2013).  
The reason the bourgeois novel is obsolete, then, is because it has not ‘adapted to new 
probabilities.’ Instead, Wark characterises the bourgeois novel as ‘a genre of fantasy 
fiction smeared with naturalistic details – filler – to make it appear otherwise. It 
excludes the totality so that bourgeois subjects can keep prattling on about their 
precious “inner lives.”’ Yet, as we’ve seen, critical theory has not adapted in the 
Anthropocene either. In fact, to include it seriously in the argument Wark makes about 
literature and art only serves to place further emphasis on the idea that we are arriving 
at ‘a great derangement’, a period when no element remains in its original place. For ours 
is a time when established theory too can be said to obscure rather than express the 
changing nature of the times and the time of nature. As with the bourgeois novel, it’s 
a derangement that works through formal limitations. In the case of theory, these 
limitations involve the named individualistic author, the immutable object, intellectual 
property and so forth. As with the modern novel, the screening out of this scaffolding 
‘continues to be essential’ to the functioning of what we might now rather teasingly 
refer to as bourgeois theory (Wark, 2017b; quoting Ghosh, 2016: 23). To further 
paraphrase Ghosh by way of Wark, here then is the great irony of theory in the 
Anthropocene: ‘the very gestures with which it conjures up’ nonhuman actors, objects 
and elements ‘are actually a concealment’ of them (Wark, 2017b; quoting Ghosh, 2016: 
23).  
The performance of serious theory today is thus as formally limited to bourgeois liberal 
humanism as the novel. This means it’s extremely difficult, if not impossible, for even 
the most radical of political theories to do anything other than exclude the diversity of 
human and nonhuman presences. To sample and remix Wark’s text on the novel in 
the Anthropocene in order to further undercut notions of the author as self-identical 
human individual: anything that would actually impact on the concealment of theory’s 
established scaffolding, how it’s created, published and disseminated, is regarded as 
not proper, eccentric, odd, and risks banishment. ‘But from what? Polite bourgeois 
society?’ The for-profit world of Verso books and Routledge journals where proper 
theory is to be found?13 
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In this way theory eliminates the ‘improbable’ – including non-humanist, non-liberal 
modes of being and doing – ‘from serious consideration’. We could perhaps cite as 
examples designed to provoke further speculation the fact that an orang-utan in 
Argentina called Sandra has been declared by the courts there to be a ‘nonhuman 
person’ with legal rights; that the Whanganui river in New Zealand has been given the 
same rights as a human person; and that the Amazon has recently been declared a ‘subject 
of rights’ by Colombia’s supreme court in a bid to protect it from further deforestation 
(Chapel, 2014; Roy, 2017; Margil, 2018). If nonhuman things can now have rights and 
be the party of interest in administrative proceedings – just as they have at various 
times and places in the past14 – can we envisage reaching a point in the future where a 
work of critical theory can be legally and professionally recognised as having been co-
authored by an ape, a river, a forest, an ecosystem, even by nature in general? If so, 
what would the consequences be for our notions of the author, creativity and 
copyright?15 Does even asking such improbable questions not involve us in imposing 
legal and professional strictures that are designed for humans onto nature? Certainly, 
from the perspective of bourgeois theory, that which is outside its inherited frame in 
this respect can only appear as ‘strange’, ‘weird’, ‘freaky’. Any such ‘strangeness’ 
emanating from an actual engagement with the implications of the Anthropocene can 
thus be kept in the ‘background’, the unmarked environment in which theory takes 
place, or moved into it. As is the case with the bourgeois novel, such theory – with 
rare exceptions – ‘draws a sharp distinction between the human and the nonhuman’, 
not to mention the ‘collective and collaborative’. Here, too, the actions of individual 
human agents are treated as ‘discontinuous with other agents’, elements and energies 
(including ‘the masses, peoples, movements’), even though “the earth of the 
Anthropocene is precisely a world of insistent, inescapable continuities…” (Wark, 
2017b; quoting Ghosh, 2016: 62). 
We can therefore see that bourgeois theory clearly ‘isn’t working’. The nonhuman, 
climate breakdown, the Anthropocence in general, all exceed what the form of proper 
theory can currently express. Like the novel, it has not adapted to the new reality 
ushered in by the Anthropocene, including all those laws and legal decisions that are 
starting to pile up around the question of the rights of nature. Instead, theory ‘imposes 
itself on a nature it cannot really perceive or value’. Just as ‘serious fiction, like 
bourgeois culture, now seems rather unserious, indeed frivolous’, so too does serious 
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theory. The nonhuman may be what a lot of contemporary critical theory studies and 
writes about, but it cannot take seriously the implications of the nonhuman for theory. 
As a result, the current landfill of theoretical literature on the Anthropocene is merely 
a form of bourgeois liberal humanism smeared with nonhuman filler – objects, materials, 
technologies, animals, insects, plants, fungi, compost, microbes, stones, geological 
formations – to make it appear otherwise.  
 
IV. Weird, Unsettling Monsters 
To be fair, the situation I’ve described creates problems for my own ways of being a 
theorist, too. After all, if what I'm doing is placing a question mark against both our 
neoliberal and liberal humanist models of subjectivity, it’d be naïve to expect there’s 
going to be a large, pre-existing audience out there I can appeal to. (Much like Eribon 
and Louis, then, I’m not sure whom it is I’m writing for here.) It could even be said 
that, in denaturalising and destabilising notions of the virtuoso human author, 
creativity and copyright, my work is designed to challenge many of the common-sense 
values and practices that could otherwise be used to gather an audience around it. 
Consequently, riffing on Gilles Deleuze’s (1997) concept of ‘missing people’ and 
Derrida’s (2005) ‘democracy to come’, I sometimes think of the potential readership 
for my work in terms of a community to come, even a missing community.  
This is another reason I’m interested in experimenting with ways of being a theorist 
that a lot of people may find difficult to understand. It’s about doing something that 
is indeed strange, weird, awkward, confusing, surprising; something that’s not so easy 
to approach unconsciously, in a default setting, as if it’s already known and understood 
in advance. I’m certainly not interested in making myself appear more human in my 
work. I don’t want to think these issues through the lens of memoir in the manner 
Eribon and Louis do. For me, the biographical human subject is more of a symptom 
than a cure. So I provide very little in the way of autobiographical information as a 
means of peaking people’s interest and holding their attention: next to nothing about 
my life, background, class, sexuality, personal vices or virtues. I don’t use either words 
or pictures to share what it feels like to be me or tell the story of the struggles I’ve 
overcome to get where I am, and how that process has changed me. Nor do I create 
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opportunities to form interpersonal relationships with me by using Instagram, 
LinkedIn, Twitter et al. In fact, I try to avoid anything that might have the effect of 
obviously humanizing me.  
Since it’s clearly leading me to break many of the rules about how to attract a 21st 
century audience, I realize this risks coming across as my being wilfully difficult, if not 
self-defeating. (And all the more so in an era of intersectionality, when people are 
conceived as being the sum total of their class, race, gender and other identities. It is 
an era when, as a number of commentators have pointed out, individuals ‘not only 
bear the entire history of these identities; they “own” them. A person who is not 
defined by them cannot tell the world what it is like to be a person who is’ [Menand, 
2018]. A backstory can be useful in such circumstances in making one appear more 
authentic.) But if I’m interested in transforming the dominant discourse network and 
its manufactured common sense about how (posthuman) knowledges are to be 
created, published and circulated today, then it’s a risk I have to take. 
Having said that, if we want to avoid falling passive victim to ways of acting already 
established in advance, we need to be careful not to merely substitute one set of rules 
for another: those associated with the production of long-form books of antihumanist 
or posthumanist theory, say. It’s for this reason that my work does not necessarily 
adhere to predefined ideas concerning what forms a theoretical text can take16. As I 
say, I’m experimenting with new ways of being a theorist that are neither simply 
neoliberal nor liberal humanist; and I’m doing so because, rather than endeavouring to 
speak on behalf of a pre-existing community or otherwise represent them (as we saw 
Eribon and Louis trying to do with the working class), it seems to me we have to 
actively invent the context, the culture, in which such a missing community – replete 
with new notions of the subject, agency, the human and so on – can emerge. What’s 
more, we have to do so without any assurances or certainty on our part that this will 
actually happen. We know from Derrida that the future is monstrous. “A future that 
would not be monstrous would not be a future” (Derrida in Weber, 1995: 386-7). As 
theorists, we need to open ourselves to a future in which we do not simply adhere to 
the proper, accepted systems for creating, disseminating and storing our work, replete 
with their pre-programmed ideas regarding the singular human author, originality and 
copyright. Rather, we need to display what Eribon describes as a “lack of respect’ for 
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those rules of bourgeois liberal humanist decorum that insist “people follow 
established norms regarding ‘intellectual debate’ when what is at stake clearly has to 
do with a political struggle” (161). In short, we need to be weird, unsettling monsters. 
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Notes 
1 Unless indicated otherwise, all further references in the text are to this book – the U.S. version, which 
I bought shortly after it came out in 2013. 
2 See Solomon (2018), referring to research undertaken by Aaron Reeves and Sam Friedman (2017).  
3 Related figures have recently been provided for important broadcasters and editors in news media 
(‘43% having been privately educated and 36% graduating from Oxbridge’) and newspaper columnists 
(44% attending either Oxford or Cambridge, with 44% also attending independent school, with a third 
coming through the ‘independent school to Oxbridge “pipeline” alone’) – see The Sutton Trust 
(2019). It is also worth noting that I use the term ‘private school’ to refer to any secondary school that 
is fee-paying. They are private in the sense anyone can open one. This distinguishes them from state 
schools, which are subject to different rules and regulations. As it is used here, ‘private school’ thus 
encompasses those fee-paying institutions known as ‘public schools’ – public because they were 
established by statute and acknowledged in law. Strictly speaking, however, only those ‘leading’ private 
secondary schools that are members of the self-selecting Headmasters and Headmistresses 
Conference are ‘public schools’. 
4 After the 2011 jury for the Man Booker prize stated that they were going to privilege writing that was 
‘readable’, the Goldsmith’s Prize was established in 2013 – with Josipovici as one of the judges - to 
explicitly encourage experiments designed to open ‘up new possibilities for the novel form.’ 
5 The word ‘datum’ means a proposition that is assumed, given or taken for granted, upon which a 
theoretical framework can be constructed or a conclusion drawn as a result of reasoning or calculation. 
In engineering the datum point is the place from which measurements are taken. The datum point 
itself, however, is not checked or questioned. As the position from which measurements are made it 
is precisely a given. See Hall, 2016: 47.  
6 Pirate Philosophy 1.0 and 2.0 investigates some of the implications of so-called internet piracy for the 
humanities, particularly the latter’s ideas of authorship, content creation and copyright. The project 
explores such ideas philosophically and legally through the creation of an actual ‘pirate’ text using 
peer-to-peer BitTorrent networks.  
The Radical Open Access Collective is a community of non-profit presses, journals and other projects. 
Formed in 2015, and now consisting of over 60 members, the collective seeks to build a progressive 
alternative ecosystem for open publishing in the humanities and social sciences, based on 
experimenting with a diversity of non-profit, independent and scholar-led approaches. For more 
details about these and other projects, see my Media Gifts: http://garyhall.squarespace.com/about/. 
7 See the Post-H(uman) Index? Politics, Metrics, and Agency in the Accelerated Academy conference, 
held at the Faculty of Education, University of Cambridge, November 30, 2018, where I first 
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presented a version of this material. https://cpgjcam.net/2018/08/30/cfp-post-human-index-
politics-metrics-and-agency-in-the-accelerated-academy/  
8 Duncan Bell is just one of many political theorists to have developed an argument to this effect. In 
‘What is Liberalism?’, a history of how liberalism has been variously understood as a category of 
political analysis, he insists: “‘Thomas Nagel is surely right to proclaim that “… most political 
argument in the Western world now goes on between different branches of [the liberal] tradition.” … 
Most inhabitants of the West are now conscripts of liberalism: the scope of the tradition has expanded 
to encompass the vast majority of political positions regarded as legitimate … and most who identify 
themselves as socialists, conservatives, social democrats, republicans, greens, feminists, and anarchists 
have been ideologically incorporated, whether they like it or not’ (Bell, 2014: 689; citing Nagel, 2003: 
62). Of course, Bell was writing in 2014: so before the 2016 presidential election victory of Trump in 
the U.S., but not before the rise to prominence of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, Viktor Orbán in 
Hungary and Jarosław Kaczyński in Poland. 
9 Newfield emphasises that ‘humanism has always seen the liberal arts and sciences as central to higher 
education. They are “liberal” because all of their disciplines, from linguistics to history to sociology to 
biology to astrophysics, focus simultaneously on subject expertise and the formation of the self that 
is acquiring the expertise. Vocational training cannot be separated from self-development. The 
training is only as good as the self that grasps it. Every liberal arts and sciences course in a university 
is in principle about intellectual development and self-development at the same time’ (Newfield, 2016: 
328-329). 
10 This is coupled to an emphasis on privatisation (e.g., of the public realm by for-profit businesses), on 
deregulation, on low taxes for the rich and for private interests, on a weakening of the power of the 
trade unions, and on a reduction to a minimum of the role played by the state, the public sector and 
welfare, not least with regard to health, education, employment, food and housing. 
11  For more on the posthuman humanities, see Braidotti, 2013: 157; and ‘What are the Digital 
Posthumanities?’ in Hall, 2016. For an earlier rehearsal of some of these ideas concerning the inhuman, 
see Hall, 2017. 
12  I should mention that my understanding of the inhuman is somewhat different from that of 
McKenzie Wark. For Wark, the inhuman is ‘an apparatus of labor and technology. Indeed, the inhuman 
is the zone where the partition between the human and nonhuman is negotiated, at the expense of 
rendering the inhuman labor in between invisible. There is no such thing as a “history of ideas,” only 
of the labor and technics of producing them’ (Wark, 2017b:  https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/
3356-on-the-obsolescence-of-the-bourgeois-novel-in-the-anthropocene). 
13 Like General Intellects, Wark’s 2015 book on the Anthropocene, Molecular Red, was published by Verso. 
14 See the Tree That Owns Itself, the original of which is thought to date back to somewhere between 
the mid-16th and late 18th century: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tree_That_Owns_Itself. My thanks 
to Jurij Smrke for this reference.  
15 For a variation on such questions, see those raised by the artist Marija Bozinovska Jones in ‘Treebour’ 
(see https://we-make-money-not-art.com/treebour-do-we-pay-trees-fairly-for-the-immaterial-labour
-they-perform-for-us/), her contribution to ‘Playbour – Work, Pleasure, Survival’ (see https://
www.furtherfield.org/playbour-work-pleasure-survival/), a 2018 exhibition at Furtherfield gallery in 
London. They include should we pay trees for the immaterial labour they perform for us? 
16 Let me provide as one last example a special 2016 issue of the Journal of Electronic Publishing, co-edited 
by Janneke Adema and myself. ‘Disrupting the Humanities: Towards Posthumanities’ (Adema and 
Hall, 2016) constitutes a selection of heavily annotated video-presentations/articles cum 
performances that endeavours to break down the divisions between research and presentation, the 
‘real time’ and online or ‘virtual’ audience. It has its basis in ‘Disrupting the Humanities’, a series of 
seminars that explored research and scholarship in a ‘posthumanities’ context, organised by the Centre 
for Disruptive Media at Coventry University. This seminar series critically engaged the humanist 
legacy of the humanities, and creatively explored alternative and affirmative possible futures for the 
humanities. The series was accompanied by a wiki that is still available here: 
http://disruptivemedia.org.uk/wiki/. 
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